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Jeremy A. Clarke 
In the Case ^/Federalism v. Charter; 
The Processes and Outcomes of a Federalist 
Dialogue1 
Abstract 
The Charter of Rights has long been criticized for the supposed failure of its 
processes and outcomes to comply with Canadian federalism. This paper 
challenges those suppositions. The examination of five Supreme Court cases 
/Ford (1988); Lavigne (1991); Advance Cutting (2001a); Dunmore (2001b); 
and Solski (2005a)] through the lens of a 'federalist dialogue" reveals a 
process o/'Charter interpretation in which provinces, far from being excluded, 
actually play a central role. Furthermore, this dialogue has the potential to 
generate an outcome—Charter-federalism—that is consistent with Canada's 
moral foundations. 
Résumé 
On reproche depuis longtemps à la Charte des droits la présumée 
impossibilité de rendre ses processus et ses résultats conformes au 
fédéralisme canadien. Ce document conteste ces suppositions. L'examen de 
cinq arrêts de la Cour suprême (Tord (1988), Lavigne (1990), Advance 
Cutting (2001a), Dunmore (2001b) et Solski (2005s)) sous Vangle d'un 
« dialogue fédéraliste » révèle un processus d'interprétation de la Charte 
dans lequel les provinces, loin d'être exclues, jouent un rôle central. En outre, 
ce dialogue peut produire un résultat — le fédéralisme axé sur la Charte — 
qui est conforme aux bases morales du Canada. 
Introduction 
For twenty-five years, scholars and governments have predicted that the 
Charter of Rights would run roughshod over provincial diversity. Yet the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Charter's pan-Canadian values 
seems to have exhibited considerable sensitivity to federalism (Kelly 2001 ; 
2005). To help explain this jurisprudence, I have described a "federalist 
dialogue" (Clarke 2006), occurring alongside its better known 
"democratic" counterpart (Hogg and Bushell 1997; Roach 2001). 
According to this federalist dialogue, the Supreme Court's federalism 
jurisprudence can be considered a "response" to provinces' own Charter 
interpretation. A survey of provincial arguments (factums) in Charter cases 
reveals that provinces often couch defences of their policy in appeals to 
federalism. A subsequent reading of Supreme Court decisions reveals 
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enough consistency to conclude that provinces have exerted considerable 
influence over the Court's Charter interpretation, helping to shape its 
federalism jurisprudence. 
This paper proceeds in the same framework. But where the earlier 
inquiry was merely descriptive (Do provinces ground their arguments in the 
language of federalism? Does the Court respond?), this paper contemplates 
the wider significance of the federalist dialogue. Specifically, it considers 
the capacity of this dialogue to address concerns that the outcomes and 
processes of Charter interpretation are poorly suited, even inimical to 
Canadian federalism. The paper begins with an account of these critiques 
and the suggestion that considerable gaps in our understanding persist. The 
paper then proceeds with two separate discussions of Charter litigation 
through the lens of the federalist dialogue. 
The first discussion involves three related cases: Lavigne (1991), 
Advance Cutting (2001a), and Dunmore (2001b). Alone, each case 
revolved around a section 2(d) (freedom of association) challenge to 
provincial labour relations policy. Taken together, however, they provide 
compelling evidence of an ongoing dialogue about federalism and section 1 
of the Charter, in addition to allowing provinces to place limits on 
pan-Canadian Charter rights, but it allows them to place different limits on 
those rights. The second discussion involves two cases [Ford (1988); and 
Solski (2005a)] that appear unrelated, but are united by provincial 
differences that extend beyond the limitation of Charter rights, and to their 
very definition. Yet while conventional understandings of judicial 
interpretation encourage a uniform interpretation of rights, the federalist 
dialogue appears capable of eliciting a dualist interpretation of the Charter, 
where provincial context demands it. Taken together—and with similar 
findings elsewhere (Clarke 2006)—these cases exhibit processes and 
outcomes of Charter interpretation that are consistent with Canadian 
federalism. 
The Charter and Federalism: Flawed Outcomes? 
Since its adoption, the Charter of Rights has been chided for failing to 
comply with Canada's federal foundations. The details of these charges are 
varied and complex, but generally fall into one of two camps.processes and 
outcomes. Neither critique has gone unchallenged, of course, but both have 
been the subject of considerable debate. Yet the rejoinders have failed in 
important respects, and concern for federalism in a Charter context 
endures. Beginning with "outcomes," the following paragraphs trace these 
debates, exposing their failings before discussing how the federalist 
dialogue helps in their remedy. 
Outcome-based objections are grounded in the assumptions of the 
"centralization thesis" (Kelly 2001), which holds that the Charter's 
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supposedly national standards, enforced by a centralized judiciary, will 
effect a standardizing trend in areas of policy previously subject to 
provincial discretion (see, for instance, Hogg 1989, 250; LaForest, 1995, 
134). If the Charter prohibits or compels a particular behaviour of one 
province, so the thesis goes, then it must also prohibit or compel the same 
behaviour in all provinces. Such an outcome is, however, contrary to 
Canadian federalism's raison d'être: the protection of distinctive 
communities—or at least the capacity to build distinctive communities—in 
Quebec and elsewhere (Ajzenstat et al. 1999, 235; LaSelva 1996, 8-9; 
Vipond 1991, 18). Far, then, from fostering the unity for which its 
champions hoped (Trudeau 1968, 52-60), Charter outcomes can only 
breed resentment and disunity. If the Charter is to be somehow prevented 
from destroying the country, then, these uniform outcomes must be 
prevented by "reconciling" the Charter with federalism (LaSelva 1996, 
64-98). Prescriptions for rapprochement vary, but typically suggest some 
form of constitutional amendment to ensure that the outcomes of Charter 
disputes are less pan-Canadian, and more cognizant of the provinces' 
diverse legal, political and cultural traditions in general, and of Quebec's 
distinctiveness in particular (see, for instance, LaSelva 1996,88-89; Cairns 
1995,192-93; LaForest 1995; Schneiderman 1992,258-60; Taylor 1993, 
181-84.198-200). 
It comes as something of a surprise that scholars would insist that, absent 
constitutional change, Charter outcomes are impervious to Canadian 
federalism. After all, federalism has long been considered the most, or at 
least among the most important independent variables in Canadian political 
science—capable of re-casting publics, governments, and institutions 
(Simeon 2002,36-37). On the eve of its adoption, Donald Smiley assumed 
that the Charter's pan-Canadianism would be no less vulnerable to 
federalism, querying "what are the capacities of the Charter to resist [the] 
provincializing currents in the Canadian political culture?" (Smiley 1981, 
61) Yet despite this prediction from the foremost student of Canadian 
federalism, and despite the division of powers' ubiquity as an independent 
variable, when it comes to the Charter, federalism is roundly considered 
dependent: affected by, but never affecting the Charter Absent 
constitutional amendment, federalism is seen as incapable of exacting 
Charter outcomes that are consistent with its moral foundations. 
But why should the Charter be so immovable? Even constitutions, 
perhaps especially constitutions, are capable of informal change. Students 
of the Canadian Constitution are well-acquainted with Lord Sankey's 
"living tree," portraying the Constitution as organic, changing with society 
itself (JCPC 1930). Sankey wrote of the British North America Act, of 
course, but his metaphor has since been used to describe how the judicial 
interpretation of the Charter amounts to "micro-constitutional 
amendment" (Manfredi 1997, 113-14), distinct from the "macro-con-
stitutional" politics of Meech Lake, for instance (Russell 1993). It is a given 
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among political scientists that, quite apart from formal amendment, the 
Charter can, and has come to, represent something very different than a . 
strict or prior reading of its provisions suggests. 
Perhaps this informal constitutional change is what Smiley anticipated 
when he wrote that thé Charter would be shaped and altered by federalism. 
If federalism can account for changes in other institutions' capacity "to 
recognize and accommodate regional... elements of Canadian diversity" 
(Simeon 2002,37), it must also be capable of overcoming any failure of the 
Charterto represent those same "regional elements". Formal change might 
make a sceptic's preferred outcome more obvious, or even more certain, but 
it does not preclude the Charter's reconciliation with federalism by other 
means, including informal, micro-constitutional change. The Court itself 
has described federalism as an "underlying principle" to be considered 
alongside individual and minority rights (SCC 1998, 49), and several 
scholars have recorded the balancing of rights with federalism in the 
Charter context specifically. Building on the work of Janet Hiebert (1996) 
and Katherine Swinton (1990; 1995), James Kelly has found evidence that 
fears of homogenizing Charter outcomes have been greatly exaggerated 
(2001; 2005, chapter 6). Not only have fewer provincial statutes fallen to 
Charter review than might have been expected, but more significantly, the 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence includes a Charter interpretation that 
respects diversity and provincial autonomy (Kelly 2005,181). 
Kelly's is an important contribution. However, while he describes the 
Court's federalism jurisprudence as the much-needed "reconciliation," it is 
not immediately evident that this is the case. What Kelly describes is a 
compromise: neither provincial relativism nor pervasive pan-Canadianism 
has triumphed over the other. But "reconcile" suggests that this 
compromise conforms to some normative ideal, consistent with Canada's 
"moral foundations." Alan Cairns, Samuel LaSelva, Charles Taylor and 
others have told us that nothing short of constitutional amendment would 
suffice. And while Kelly shows that federalism has informed Charter 
interpretation absent of such formal change, he does not demonstrate that 
this compromise is consistent with what is normatively compelled. In fact, 
the only ideal against which Kelly measures his "reconciliation" is the 
intent of the Charter's framers—a group from which he specifically 
exempts the provinces (Kelly 2005, 87). 
Furthermore, regardless of the sufficiency of this compromise, our 
understanding of how it is reached is wanting. While the Court 
acknowledged the need for balance between rights and federalism in the 
Secession Reference, in the same decision it declared itself responsible for 
the articulation of that balance (Monahan 1999, 182). As there is an 
expectation that a national institution applying supposedly national 
standards will tend towards homogeneity (Shapiro 1981; Bzdera 1993), 
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how can we account for the federalist sensitivity in the Court's Charter 
jurisprudence? 
One explanation might lie with the judges themselves. There is, for 
instance, the constitutional convention of regional composition on the 
bench. But the appointment of judges from Canada's four regions is largely 
symbolic, and is held by the judges themselves not to colour their 
constitutional interpretation (Laskin, in Canada 1985,319). Then there is 
the justices' legal environment. Prior to the Charter, the division of powers 
was the bread and butter of constitutional law, and a legal education in such 
issues must shape interpretation of other constitutional provisions. 
However, post-1982, federalism has taken a backseat to the Charter in the 
classroom, the literature, and the docket (see, for instance, Macdonald 
2007, 76-77; Epp 1998, 172-76). Familiarity with an increasingly 
marginalized body of constitutional law cannot wholly explain a sustained 
sensitivity to federalism in the face of the dominant discourse of 
pan-Canadian rights. 
For his part, Kelly credits the judicial sensitivity to the institu-
tionalization of rights-vetting in provincial departments of justice (Kelly 
2005,215-19). This may help explain declining rates of nullification. As 
provinces incorporate rights-scrutiny into the policy process, the resulting 
policy should be less susceptible to Charter challenge. But even if 
questions about the actual effects of this exercise are ignored,2 Charter 
vetting is less persuasive as an explanation of the federalism 
jurisprudence—the federalist interpretation—that is so central to Kelly's 
"reconciliation". Since vetting takes place in the provincial executive, there 
is no record of the considerations that informed provincial interpretations of 
their Charter obligations (Hiebert 2002, 15), including whether or not 
federalism plays a role. Any link between provincial vetting and the Court's 
federalism jurisprudence is, therefore, tenuous. 
Not only, then, do we lack an understanding of the extent to which 
Charter outcomes are reconcilable with the normative foundations of 
Canadian federalism, we lack an understanding of how those outcomes are 
reached, and the extent to which they conform to the provinces' own 
interpretation. This concern, however, is better suited to a discussion of the 
second federalist critique of the Charter, the process of its interpretation. 
The Charter and Federalism: Flawed Processes? 
For some, regardless of the outcome, the process by which Charter disputes 
are resolved is illegitimate in a federal society. By allowing aggrieved 
individuals or minorities to engage courts in an "end-run" around 
unsympathetic provincial majorities, the Charter is described as 
undermining federalism's preference for local decision-making (Morton 
and Knopff 2000,60-63; Maclvor 2005,222). Scholarly unease with the 
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processes oîCharter interpretation has, however, been registered largely in 
isolation of federalism. Since the Charter's first days, where scholars have 
questioned the legitimacy of judicial review, their concern has not been for 
the relationship between courts and federalism, but between courts and 
legislatures (LaSelva 1983,383-84). Still, while its preoccupation may not 
be federalism,perse, this literature's relevancy is not diminished. Most of 
the legislatures for which these scholars are concerned are, after all, 
representative of provincial populations. 
The critique of the process ofCharter interpretation is many-faceted. But 
disagreement is limited primarily to questions about who derives the most 
benefit from those processes, and there is broad agreement at the core. 
Scholars on the left and the right echo variants of a common refrain: because 
the Charter turns matters of public policy into questions for judicial 
resolution, it is "deeply and fundamentally undemocratic, not just in the 
simple and obvious sense of being anti-majoritarian, but also in the more 
serious sense of eroding the habits and temperament of representative 
democracy" (Morton and Knopff 2000, 149; see also Manfredi 2001; 
Brodie 2002; Hutchinson 1995; Mandel 1994). 
In response has emerged a body of work seeking to reconcile the 
processes of Charter review with Canadian democracy. For the past decade 
in particular, this endeavour has assumed the form of a discussion about the 
potential for legislatures to engage in their own Charter interpretation. To 
dispel the notion that Canada's legislatures are helpless Charter actors, 
entirely subject to judicial whim, Peter Hogg and Alison Bushell depict the 
Charter process as a "democratic dialogue" that may begin with courts, but 
can continue with legislatures. Following a judicial declaration of 
invalidity, the Charter's structure allows the elected branches to "reply" 
with legislation "that accomplishes the same objectives" but is less 
impairing of (section 1), or operates notwithstanding (section 33) Charter 
rights (Hogg and Bushell 1997,75; See also Roach 2001). 
This democratic dialogue has itselfbeen subject to much criticism. Some 
are dubious, for instance, of the latitude that is actually available to respond 
to an adverse judicial ruling (Morton 2001; Manfredi and Kelly 1999). But 
even someone willing to concede some capacity for response might not be 
persuaded. The problem lies with the dialogue's "presumption in favour of 
judicial supremacy of constitutional interpretation" (Manfredi 2004,148; 
2001,178-79). Whatever room there is to reply, with the notwithstanding 
clause, for instance, sceptics note that it is not considered reasonable for 
legislatures to question the judiciary's interpretation of what the Charter 
means in the first instance (Manfredi 2004, 148). Nor is this judicial 
monopoly limited to the definition of the Charter's substantive provisions 
(what is "free expression," for instance?), it inhibits the "main engine" for 
legislative participation: section 1. While section 1 may, in theory, allow 
government to enact "reasonable" limits on judicially defined Charter 
46 
In the Case o/Federalism v. Charter: 
The Processes and Outcomes of a Federalist Dialogue 
rights where they are "demonstrably justified," this capacity is severely 
restricted by the fact that the judiciary defines what is "reasonable" and 
when a limit has been "justified" (Baccigalupo 1991, 133-34). As this 
uneven division of institutional labour is not disputed by the dialogue's 
staunchest proponents (Roach 2001,13), process sceptics appear justified 
to question the sincerity of the metaphor. "Dialogue" hardly captures a 
process of Charter interpretation where one party is precluded from 
contributing to that interpretation, and is able to reply only by either 
expressly disagreeing with the Charter's "meaning" or by legislating 
according to what the Court deems reasonable (Hiebert 2002,50-51). 
However, if the dialogists' problem is the prescription that Charter 
interpretation should be free from government influence after the fact, their 
critics' problem is their presumption that judicial interpretation is free from 
that influence to begin with. Critics of the dialogue and the process of 
Charter interpretation more generally, uncritically assume that judicial 
interpretation is the product of court-centric factors alone, and fail to 
consider extra-legal stimuli. To be sure, judges are somewhat sheltered 
from the external environment and intrinsic influences must be considered 
important. The attitudinal model, for instance, stresses the importance of 
the judges themselves, and the personal and professional values they bring 
to die bench (Ostberg and Wetstein 2007). In a similarly court-centric 
paradigm, legal positivism holds that, "the law" itself (constitutional text, 
legal rules, and doctrine), directs judicial decision-making (Beatty 1995; 
Choudhry and Howse 2000, 151-54). But, important as they are, such 
court-centric factors cannot explain judicial interpretation in toto. Judicial 
attitudes and legal rules channel and constrain, but they do not define 
constitutional interpretation (Baier 2006,163; Epstein and Kobylka 1992, 
12-13). 
Lee Epstein and Joseph Kobylka conclude that the most profound 
influence on judicial interpretation of the American Constitution is had by 
the legal actors who present courts with their own constitutional 
impressions in the form of legal argument. And while Epstein and Kobylka 
have not tested their theory in the Canadian context, Christopher Manfredi 
has. In a recent study of the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund 
(LEAF), Manfredi verified the assumption that "it is the law and legal 
arguments as framed by legal actors that most clearly influence the content 
and direction of legal change" (Manfredi 2004, xix). Manfredi found 
sufficient correlation between the language in LEAF'S factums and the 
Supreme Court's decisions to conclude that the women's group has exerted 
considerable influence on prevailing constitutional interpretation 
(Manfredi 2004, 69-73, 125). But governments—and specifically 
provincial governments—are no less "legal actors" who tender arguments 
before the Supreme Court. Governments possess all of the characteristics of 
the most successful interest group litigants (Galanter 1974) and are 
described in Canada as the "real repeat players" of constitutional litigation 
47 
International Journal of Canadian Studies 
Revue internationale d'études canadiennes 
(Roach 2001,145). If provinces were to enjoy a LEAF-like influence—if 
they are not merely the passive recipients of, but active participants in 
judicial interpretation—then perhaps concerns about Charter processes 
and federalism are exaggerated. 
A number of scholars seem at least open to the suggestion that 
governments might influence judicial interpretation, if by less direct 
means. Matthew Hennigar suggests that judicial decisions may be 
considered "responses" to a legislature's initial assessment of 
constitutionality (Hennigar 2004,16-17); Janet Hiebert has argued that a 
demonstrable record of rights-based legislative scrutiny could affect 
judicial decisions (Hiebert 1996, 153-54); and of course James Kelly 
intimates that bureaucratic Charter scrutiny explains decreasing rates of 
judicial nullification (Kelly 2005,209-13). Yet for all this speculation, little 
has actually been done to measure the impact of governments as legal 
actors, aside, that is, from an earlier discussion of the "federalist dialogue" 
(Clarke 2006). According to this dialogue, the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence, and its federalism-Carter jurisprudence in particular, can 
be thought of as a "response" to provincial governments' own 
interpretations of the Charter. Provincial factums reveal that provinces will 
often couch their defences in Charter interpretations that have been 
coloured by federalism and diversity. This may seem like counter-intuitive 
behaviour. Since the text of the Charter does not seem to permit arguments 
based on diversity, it may not seem like the most effective use of legal 
resources (Knopff and Morton 1985,170-71). Nevertheless, the reading of 
the judicial decisions reveals sufficient consistency with these provincial 
arguments to conclude that provinces themselves have exerted 
considerable influence over the Court's own jurisprudence. To date, the 
federalist dialogue has only been traced over several section 15(1) equality 
challenges. But if it is characteristic of other Charter litigation, then 
perhaps Charter processes are not as inconsistent with federalism as the 
sceptics insist. 
The remainder of this paper is dedicated to an examination of several 
more instances of Charter litigation through the framework of the federalist 
dialogue, and brings those findings to bear on our understanding of Charter 
processes and Charter outcomes. Before proceeding, however, a brief note 
on casé selection is warranted» 
A Note on Case Selection 
Federalism does not always factor into the defence of provincial policy 
against Charter challenge. But where it does, it takes one of two forms. 
Most often, provinces will appeal to section 1 of the Charter, and the need 
for a distinctive limitation of otherwise pan-Canadian rights. At times, 
however, provinces will appeal to a federalist, or province-specific 
interpretation of the Charter's substantive provisions themselves. To 
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appreciate both sides of the federalist dialogue, therefore, this paper will 
examine cases from each category—two of the former and three of the 
latter. Ideally, a sweeping examination of all provincial Charter litigation 
might be preferred. But quite aside from practical considerations, there is 
good reason to curb the present discussion. 
Political scientist Carl Baar once lamented the Canadian discipline's 
tendency to shy away from small-n analyses of judicial decision-making, 
which were dismissed as too descriptive—nice journalism, but not good 
social science (Baar 1986, 57). But, Baar suggests, if we are to explain a 
process as complex as constitutional interpretation, a more qualitative 
approach is required. With the arrival of the Charter and the increasing 
importance of judicial processes it heralded, Baar hoped his Canadian 
colleagues would follow the lead of their American counterparts, where 
"the most complex and illuminating picture of judicial decision-making 
may come from the examination of a single case or related set of cases" 
(Baar 1986,58). One of the goals of this paper is to promote understanding 
of the processes of constitutional interpretation. Taking Baar's advice 
seriously, rather than attempt a sweeping quantitative analysis of Charter 
litigation it engages in a more modest, but thorough qualitative examination 
of five cases. The federalist dialogue that emerges from the examination of 
these and other cases (Clarke 2006) is not determinative of the outcome of 
all Charter litigation. Nor is it the only influence on the process of Charter 
interpretation. But it is an important and unappreciated side of both. 
The Federalist Dialogue and Section 1: Lavigne, Advance Cutting, 
and Dunmore 
At issue in R. v. Advance Cutting (SCC 2001a) was the Quebec 
Construction Act, which required workers in the province's construction 
industry to hold a "competency certificate". To obtain this certificate, 
workers were required to choose one of five unions to serve as their 
bargaining agent for industry-wide collective agreements. Advance 
Cutting Ltd., a construction firm that had been charged with hiring 
uncertified workers, alleged that requiring workers to join a union violated 
Charter section 2(d), which they claimed includes the right not to associate. 
Nor, they said, could this violation be considered "reasonable" for section 1 
purposes. Although the legislative objective—stable labour relations in the 
construction industry—may have been pressing, the measures taken 
toward that objective were excessive, a point the company underscored by 
comparison with practices elsewhere in Canada. Other provinces also 
sought stable industrial relations, but did not see the need to force 
construction workers to join a sector-wide union simply to enter the 
industry. Rather, they left labour relations in the construction industry to the 
same firm-level practice as in other private sector industries (SCC 2001a, 
108). 
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Quebec presented a much different interpretation of the meaning of the 
Charter right in this case. The positive freedom to associate carried no 
corollary freedom not to. Were the Court to disagree, Quebec argued that 
the negative freedom could only be construed as to protect against forced 
association that sought to impose ideological conformity (QC 2001,18). 
The Construction Act sought only to encourage workers to engage in a 
democratic process. Neither the purpose nor the effect, therefore, imposed 
the ideological conformity necessary to establish a violation of the 
hypothetical negative freedom (QC 2001,24). 
More noteworthy for our purposes was Quebec's interpretation of 
section 1, which was included in case the Court found a prima facie 
violation. Quebec acknowledged that other provinces sought the same 
objective by less restrictive measures. However, when considering the 
Charter, one "must be circumspect about the experience in other 
jurisdictions." Specifically, comparisons with other jurisdictions should 
not be raised "without accounting for social, cultural, historical and 
political particularities" (QC 2001, 31). Other provinces may have 
employed less restrictive measures, but only because the context there did 
not compel more restrictive ones. In Quebec, they did. Quebec provided the 
Court with an extensive history of industrial relations in the Quebec 
construction industry. A product of Quebec's distinctive political history, 
the role of the Catholic Church and scandals surrounding the construction 
of 1976 Olympic venues, labour relations in the Quebec construction 
industry had been unusually tumultuous (QC 2001, 3). This context, 
exceptional among Canadian provinces, led successive governments to 
take exceptional measures, including those impugned in Advance Cutting. 
For Quebec, a proper interpretation of what the Charter requires, and what 
can be considered a "reasonable limit" allows must not, therefore, ignore 
provincial context. 
Different judges responded in different ways. Only one (L'Heureux-
Dubé) agreed entirely, including that 2(d) does not include the right not to 
associate. The remaining eight found this negative right, but accepted the 
qualification that it exists only to protect against forced ideological 
conformity. These eight split, however, on whether the Construction Act 
imposed coercion. Five3 believed that it did: to conclude otherwise would 
be to "ignore the history ofthe union movement itself (SCC 2001a, 17). Of 
these, four also rejected Quebec's federalist section 1 interpretation. A 
pre-1982 context where Charter values were not at play did not justify a 
post-1982 limitation of Charter rights (SCC 2001a, 45). Justice Iacobucci 
disagreed on this point, and would uphold the law as a reasonable limit. 
Justice LeBel, speaking for the remaining three judges, found a right not 
to associate, but agreed with Quebec that neither the purpose nor the effect 
of the impugned provisions imparted any ideological conformity (SCC 
2001a, 218-23). When combined with Justices L'Heureux-Dubé (no 
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violation) and Iacobucci (a violation, but a reasonable one), these three 
produce a majority of five who would have upheld the law. There was, 
therefore, no compulsion for LeBel to proceed with a section 1 analysis. 
LeBel did so nevertheless, going out of his (and his colleagues') way to 
agree with Quebec's federalist interpretation of the Charter's reasonable 
limitations clause. 
Since no party had disputed the legislative objective (stable industrial 
relations), the primary section 1 issue was the minimal impairment test. On 
that point, the LeBel group of judges outright rejected the comparisons 
drawn with other provinces, embracing instead Quebec's federalist 
interpretation. The Charter does not call for uniform outcomes, as feared by 
the sceptics. Rather, it more modestly "expresses shared values, which may 
be achieved differently in different [provincial] settings" (SCC 2001a, 
275). Interpretation and application of section 1 must, therefore, pay "close 
attention to the context and factual background that led to the adoption of 
the impugned legislation [emphasis added]" (276). When the Construction 
Act was viewed in its proper context—in the context "of the particular 
historical experience of Quebec's labour relations"—it passed the minimal 
impairment test (277). 
Advance Cutting exhibits all of the characteristics of a "federalist 
dialogue". Quebec's factum provided the Court with: a vision of section 1 
where provincial context matters; important information about that 
context; and its own interpretation of how the Charter's "shared values" 
should be achieved in that "setting". Amajority of the Court4 responded by 
incorporating Quebec's interpretation into their own, now prevailing 
interpretation. But the federalist dialogue shaping section 1 and labour law 
does not end with Advance Cutting. Nor does it begin there. Quebec's was 
not the first interpretation of the Charter, as it applies to labour legislation, 
which posits that jurisdictional contexts matter. Rather, Quebec borrowed 
this piece of constitutional reasoning from an earlier decision, moulding it 
for its own ends. 
When Quebec argued m Advance Cutting that section 1 must account for 
and allow for social, cultural, and political traditions, it specifically cited (at 
31 ), but adapted the Supreme Court's own reasons in Lavigne (SCC 1991 ). 
In that case, a collective agreement between the Ontario Public Sector 
Union and a community college was challenged by an employee to which 
the agreement applied, but who chose not to j oin the union. Specifically, Mr. 
Lavigne challenged the "Rand Formula," which allowed the union to 
collect monies equivalent to union dues from non-union employees. The 
issues were, therefore, not unlike those in Advance Cutting. Lavigne 
alleged that the compulsion to pay dues to a union to which he did not wish 
to belong, as well as the union's use of those funds for political activities, 
violated his freedom not to associate. To bolster his claim, Lavigne invoked 
examples from the United States. According to Lavigne, American 
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jurisprudence supported a finding that 2(d) included the freedom not to 
associate. Moreover, for section 1 purposes, Americaiilegislation provided 
evidence of collective agreements that were less restrictive of that freedom, 
allowing employees to opt out of payments that were used for political 
purposes (SCC 1991,255-56,298). 
Four of the seven justices rejected the relevance of these comparisons. 
When considering the scope of 2(d), and whether it includes a right not to 
associate, "this court must exercise caution in adopting any decision, 
however compelling, of a foreign jurisdiction." Charter rights in general 
and 2(d) in particular may express similar sentiments to their American 
counterparts. But given "the distinctive structure of the Charter'9, and the 
"specific features of the Canadian cultural, historical, social and political 
tradition," they should not be treated as carbon copies (SCC 1991,257). A 
similar logic informed their response to comparisons with "less restrictive" 
American legislation. The Court thought it best to approach American 
labour legislation with trepidation, because "the development of law in 
different cultures with different political, historical, and social traditions 
may not be easily transferred into the Canadian context" (SCC 1991,298). 
For instance, even though Canadian labour law had historically been 
modeled after the American, unions had since come to play a more vital role 
in Canada, at least relatively speaking. Since the Court found that "opt-out" 
provisions had a tendency to undermine American unions, to uncritically 
accept the comparison, and find that Canadian law unreasonably impairs 
any right not to associate, would be to ignore the distinctive Canadian 
context and, specifically, the relative importance of unions therein. 
Stated simply, the Lavigne ruling suggests the following message: 
"jurisdictional context matters." Canadians and Americans are both 
committed to free association in the abstract. But divergent political, 
cultural, and historical traditions require that the precise meaning of the 
right, and the need for its limitation, take on distinctive meaning in practice. 
This message may, on its own, have little relevance for federalism, but ten 
years later, in Advance Cutting, Quebec "federalized" this legal reasoning 
into a federalist interpretation of the Charter to shield its own legislation 
from similar comparison, but with other provinces. If international 
differences should be factored into Charter scrutiny of labour law, then so 
too should provincial ones. Moreover, the Advance Cutting Court was 
persuaded by this re-construction, stating categorically that the Charter 
does not call for provincial uniformity, but "expresses shared values which 
may be achieved differently in different [provincial] settings" (SCC 2001 a, 
275). Compelling as it is, however, this dialogue should not be taken to 
imply that provincial differences should or will always justify a differential 
approach to the Charter. Indeed Dunmore, handed down just months after 
Advance Cutting, confirms that they will not. 
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In 1994, the NDP government in Ontario extended legislative 
protections for collective bargaining to workers in the agriculture sector, 
which had traditionally been excluded from the Labour Relations Act 
(LRA). One year later, a newly elected Conservative government revoked 
those same protections. In Dunmore v. Ontario, a number of agricultural 
workers challenged that decision, alleging that the (again) under-inclusion 
left them vulnerable to employer reprisals, and unable to exercise their 2(d) 
freedom to associate. Ontario submitted that there was no violation because 
the Charter does not compel government action to assist the exercise of its 
guarantees (ON 2001,26). Should the Court disagree and find aprimafacie 
breach, Ontario argued that the legislative exclusion of agriculture was a 
reasonable limitation of free association, for two reasons. First, given the 
unpredictability of agriculture (harvest times, weather, etc. ) the industry's 
viability is particularly vulnerable to collective bargaining and the threat of 
strike action. Second, much of the agriculture industry is composed of 
family-run operations, which, given the family dynamic, are particularly 
inappropriate for unionization. Any violation of 2(d) was, therefore, 
justified to protect the Ontario industry in general, and the family farm in 
particular (ON 2001, 37). 
The workers argued that even if these were valid objectives for section 1 
purposes, the means chosen to achieve them were excessive. For instance, 
eight other provinces had extended legislative protections to their 
agriculture sectors, and yet protected family farms by carving them out of 
that regime. Like Quebec had in Advance Cutting, Ontario rejected these 
comparisons with other provinces. The province contended that to 
understand the rationale behind the exclusion in Ontario required an 
understanding of the unique characteristics of the Ontario industry (ON 
2001, 6). When those characteristics are taken into account, "profound 
differences between the agriculture sector of Ontario and that ôf other 
provinces" emerge. Interprovincial comparison is, therefore, "of no real 
value" (ON 2001,23). For one thing, the sheer size, complexity and labour 
intensiveness of the Ontario agriculture sector—unique among Canadian 
provinces—make it singularly vulnerable to the detrimental effects of 
unionization (ON 2001, 20-23). Furthermore, Ontario argued that its 
industry was so dominated by family farms that collective bargaining 
would be inappropriate in a way that it may not be elsewhere (ON 2001,14, 
37). 
Of the Court, only Justice Major agreed with Ontario (SCC 200 lb, 208). 
The remainder of the Court rejected the province on almost every count. On 
the applicability of section 2(d), the Court conceded that the Charter does 
not generally impose positive obligations on governments. However, under 
certain circumstances, "legislation that is under-inclusive may... impact 
the exercise of a fundamental freedom" (SCC 2001b, 35). If the purpose or 
the effect of the exclusion did so here, it could be construed as a violation. 
Citing anti-union rhetoric from the Conservative cabinet, L'Heureux-Dubé 
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believed that the purpose of the law was to infringe workers' rights (SCC 
2001b, 123). The remaining group of seven was not convinced that the 
legislation's purpose was so deliberate, but found that it had a sufficiently 
chilling effect on workers' ability to act collectively as to violate section 
2(d) (SCC 2001b, 48). 
These eight justices (all but Major) also rejected Ontario's federalist 
section 1 justification. They accepted that the protection of family farms 
was alaudable objective (SCC 2001b, 194). But this clidnot justify ablanket 
exclusion of all agriculture workers. To underline this point, attention was 
drawn to the practice in other provinces. InNewBrunswickand Quebec, for 
instance, protecting family farms was also a pressing concern. But rather 
than exclude all agricultural workers, these provinces extended the 
legislative protections, while carving family farms out of the scheme (SCC 
2001b, 64, 201-02). When compared to the practice elsewhere, then, 
Ontario's total exclusion could hardly be considered minimal impairment. 
What is more, unlike Advance Cutting, where the Court accepted the 
contention that Quebec's construction industry was sufficiently unique as 
to require more restrictive measures than elsewhere, the Court in Dunmore 
rejected similar arguments from Ontario. Atrend towards agri-business and 
factory farming, where collective bargaining was more appropriate, was 
occurring in all provinces, including Ontario (SCC 2001b, 62). The Ontario 
industry was not, therefore, so unique as to compel a more restrictive 
restriction of section 2(d). 
The inter-institutional give and take over the course ofLavigne, Advance 
Cutting, and Dunmore conforms to the expectations of the federalist 
dialogue: provinces defend their legislation with interpretations of section 
1 couched in the language of federalism, to which the Court may (Advance 
Cutting) or may not (Dunmore) respond with a federalism jurisprudence of 
its own. But section 1 is only the second of two Charter "steps," and it is not 
the only focus of provincial efforts to cast the Charter in federal terms. 
Provinces seek to not only put different limits on Charter rights. They seek 
different interpretations of those rights in the first place. 
Where Section 1 is not Enough: Ford (1988) 
Ford v. Quebec remains one of the most (in)famous Charter decisions. The 
nullification of Quebec's sign law, which had banned commercial 
advertising in a language other than French, prompted the National 
Assembly to take the rather extraordinary step of shielding its legislative 
response with the section 33 notwithstanding clause. Yet despite this 
assault on provincial efforts to protect Quebec's distinctive "visage 
linguistique," Ford is simultaneously considered as evidence of section 1 's 
capacity to accommodate federalism. Although the Court concluded a total 
ban on other-language advertising could not be considered a reasonable 
limitation of free expression, it accepted that the protection of the French 
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language was a pressing objective and suggested that a less-restrictive 
partial ban might be reasonable. Perhaps Quebec's legislative response 
banning the use of other languages outdoors, but allowing it indoors, would 
have survived further review (Hiebert 1996, 144). Dialogue theorists 
describe the use of section 33 as constitutional overkill, the product of an 
impoverished understanding of Charter interpretation and the democratic 
dialogue (Roach 2001,189-91). 
Nevertheless, Quebec's new law was shielded from further review, and it 
remains a matter for some speculation as to whether or not it would in fact 
have survived further judicial scrutiny. But either way, this case actually 
does little to further the capacity of section 1 to accommodate federalism in 
a Charter framework. The provincial difference that led Quebec to enact 
the law in the first place, and that the province sought to reconcile with the 
Charter in Ford, went well beyond the need to limit free expression. It went 
to the understanding of that freedom itself. Any impoverishment was not, 
therefore, with Quebec's understanding of "dialogue," but with the 
dialogists' understanding of Canadian federalism. 
At the time Ford was argued, the broad parameters of Charter 
interpretation remained largely indeterminate, and it was by no means 
obvious that the Quebec law was a prima facie violation of "free 
expression." The province of Quebec did not, therefore, limit its argument 
to the "reasonableness" of an advertising ban. The province presented the 
Court with an interpretation of section 2(b) according to which there was no 
violation. "Freedom of expression," according to Quebec, should not be 
interpreted as protecting either the right to express oneself in the language 
of one's choosing or as extending constitutional protection to commercial 
advertising (QC 1987,20-37). This differs considerably from the interpre-
tation of free expression promoted by Quebec's federal counterparts. The 
federal government intervened to promote an interpretation of section 2(b) 
that included constitutional protection not only for linguistic choice, but for 
commercial advertising (Canada 1987, 10-14). Ultimately, and in 
remarkably similar language, the Court adopted Ottawa's interpretation. 
This rejection of Quebec is not a minor point, but it is one that is overlooked 
by those who suggest the use of section 33 was not necessary to 
accommodate Quebec's distinctiveness in a Charter framework. The 
difference between Quebec's interpretation of free expression arid the 
interpretation endorsed by the federal government and Supreme Court 
reflects a deep philosophical divide that cannot be overcome by recourse to 
section 1 alone. 
Ramsay Cook might explain the difference as the product of a different 
commitment to liberalism and individual rights. Where the English 
Canadian public philosophy is concerned primarily with the individual, 
French Canadians, as a "conquered people and a minority" are generally 
more concerned with group rights (Cook 1966,146-47). Claude Galipeau 
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would describe the difference in similar terms. Quebecers may be 
increasingly liberal, but remain "less staunchly liberal [than] their English 
partners in Confederation" (Galipeau 1992, 75). When it comes to the 
French language in particular, the Québécois are "more willing to accept 
prohibitions" on individual rights such as free expression (Galipeau 1992, 
75). If Cook and Galipeau are correct about the nature of the differences 
between Quebec and die English Canada, then section 1 may indeed have 
been capable of accommodating the differences at work in Ford. If the real 
difference between Quebec and Canada outside of Quebec can be reduced 
to their respective commitment to individual rights, section 1 can 
accommodate Canadian federalism by allowing "less liberal" Quebec to 
place restrictions on free expression that "more liberal" English Canada 
might not. But the difference between Quebec and the rest of the country 
that was manifest in Ford is not reducible to such simple terms. 
For Charles Taylor it does not make sense to classify Quebec and Canada 
outside of Quebec (COQ) along a continuum of liberalism, where it is 
possible to be more or less committed to a single ideal. The important 
difference is not a matter of degree, but of kind (Taylor 1993). Quebec is not 
less committed to liberal values of individual rights than COQ. It is equally 
committed to a different brand of liberalism. According to Taylor, Canada 
outside of Quebec chooses to live according to something approaching 
"procedural liberalism," so-called because it does not promote any 
substantive vision of the good life. Instead, the society is united around 
"strong procedural commitments to treat people with equal respect" so that 
they may pursue their own conception of those ends (Taylor 1993,173). 
Such is not the case in Quebec, where the protection of the French language, 
and the generation of French-speaking people is axiomatically considered 
to be a common good; an end in itself (Taylor 1993, 175-76). In such a 
society, therefore, language is a matter for public policy, not a claim that 
individuals can make against the common. But this does not imply that 
Quebec is somehow "less liberal". There are different ideas of a liberal 
society, and a society with a collective goal may still be considered liberal 
based upon "the way in which it treats its minorities; including those who do 
not share public definitions of the good; and by the rights it accords to all its 
members" (Taylor 1993, 176). But Taylor argues we must distinguish 
between "fundamental liberties" and "privileges and immunities". In a 
procedurally liberal society, the right to advertise in the language of one's 
choosing might appropriately be considered a fundamental liberty. But 
there is something inflated about insisting that it must be considered so 
fundamental in all liberal societies. 
Read in the context of Charles Taylor's political philosophy, the 
arguments in Ford suggest that some of the differences of Canadian 
federalism cannot be accommodated within section 1 of the Charter. 
Section 1 may allow a provincial government to put a unique provincial 
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limit on otherwise pan-Canadian rights, but it cannot transform the 
definition of those rights. If a province like Quebec wishes to live according 
to a different interpretation of Charter rights, it cannot do so by way of 
section 1. But the experience of Ford notwithstanding, recent litigation 
suggests that the Court may be persuaded by a dualist interpretation of 
Charter rights themselves. 
The Federalist Dialogue and the Scope of Charter Rights: Solski 
(2005a) 
In Solski v. Quebec, the Court was forced to negotiate the collision between 
the Charter of Rights and official language minority education in Québec. 
At issue was Quebec law, which provides children with English instruction, 
provided that his or her parents are Canadian citizens, and that the child has 
received the "major part" of his or her instruction to date in English in 
Canada. The Solski parents, Canadian citizens whose children had received 
some, but not a strict majority of their education in English, applied to have 
their children educated in English. The parents' request was denied when 
the body charged with determining eligibility applied a "strict 
mathematical approach" to the law, according to which the "major part" of a 
child's education was determined only by reference to the number of 
months and years a child had been educated in English (SCC 2005a). The 
parents subsequently alleged that the "major part" criteria was a violation of 
section 23(2) of the Charter that guarantees any child "who has received or 
is receiving English or French instruction" the right to continued instruction 
in that language. 
In response, Quebec mounted an explicitly federalist Charter defence. 
The province did not, however, argue that the legislation was a reasonable 
limit on an otherwise pan-Canadian right. Rather, it suggested that there 
was no violation because section 23 should be interpreted less rigidly in 
Quebec than elsewhere. Section 23, according to the province, does not 
enjoy universal understanding. Rather, it must "be interpreted in 
accordance with the particular linguistic situation of each province" (SCC 
2005a, para. 31). Anglophones may be a minority deserving of Charter 
protections in Quebec. But so too is the Francophone majority in Quebec 
itself a minority on a national scale, deserving of the protection offered by 
federalism that grants Quebec the responsibility to exercise legislative 
powers to protect and promote its distinct culture and language (SCC 
2005a, para. 28). Given this particular linguistic dynamic, Quebec argued 
that section 23 should be interpreted as offering fewer protections to the 
Anglophone minority in Quebec than it offers to the Francophone 
population in other provinces. 
The Court's response was mixed. It did grant the parents the right to send 
their children to English language institutions, but avoided the potentially 
volatile step of striking down the law. In the Court's view, the constitutional 
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violation was not with the legislation itself, but with the rigid, quantitative 
determination of the "major part" requirement. Such an approach is 
"underinclusive; it does not achieve the purpose of s. 23(2) and, therefore, 
cannot be said to complete it or to act as a valid substitute for it" (SCC 
2005a, para. 35). But rather than strike the section from the legislation, the 
Court concluded that if "the word 'major' is given a qualitative rather than a 
quantitative meaning," the Bill could be considered permissible within the 
scope of s. 23 of the Charter (SCC 2005a, paras. 35-36). 
Even in reading down the Quebec law, however, the Court seems to have 
allowed for provincial variation in the application of that law generally and 
greater latitude for Québec more specifically. Section 23 "must take into 
account the very real differences between the situation of the minority 
language community in Quebec and the minority language communities in 
the territories and other provinces" (SCC 2005a, para. 44). Therefore, even 
though the previous English language instruction of the children in Solski 
could be expressed through a qualitative approach to the notion of what 
"major part" implies, the court conceived of certain hypothetical 
"educational experiences" that may qualify a child for minority language 
education in other provinces, does not mean that they would automatically 
qualify under Bill 101, because provincial minority language education 
schemes "are necessarily responsive to their own province's unique 
historical and social context" (SCC 2005a, 44). In this sense, the federalist 
jurisprudence in Solski is particularly federalist, and particularly 
asymmetrical. 
The cases confirm earlier suggestions (Clarke 2006) that it is useful to 
consider Charter litigation through the lens of the federalist dialogue. In 
defence of their policy, provinces are prone to propose Charter 
interpretations couched in the language of federalism. They will not always 
do so, and even when they do, the Court is not guaranteed to respond 
favourably. But the federalist dialogue is a very real part of Charter 
interpretation that has so far gone unappreciated. But how, if at all, do these 
dialogues around the Charter's substantive provisions and the reasonable 
limits clause promote our understanding of Canadian constitutionalism? 
Specifically, what do they have to say to the critics of Charter processes and 
outcomes for Canadian federalism? The following discusses these 
implications, dealing first with the processes at work. 
The "Processes" of the Federalist Dialogue 
Sceptics of the Charter's processes—from a federalist or a democratic 
perspective—object to the Charter because it empowers a centralized, 
unelected judiciary at the expense of democratically-elected and 
accountable representatives of local populations. And while these sceptics 
may be willing to concede some capacity for legislatures to respond to 
judicial rulings, they remain critical of what they perceive to be a judicial 
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monopoly on the interpretation of the Charter itself. But when Charter 
interpretation is viewed as a federalist dialogue, this monopoly disappears. 
The primary limitation with the sceptics' position is their under-
estimation of extra-judicial influences on judicial interpretation. Intrinsic 
factors (judges' attitudes, precedent, etc. ) may constrain interpretation, but 
they do not define it (Epstein and Kobylka 1992; Baier 2006). Equally 
important to understanding judicial interpretation, is an appreciation for the 
legal actors who bring their own interpretations to bear on Charter 
litigation. In the Canadian context, this influence has so far been traced 
mainly to advocacy groups (Manfredi 2004). But the federalist dialogue 
observed here and elsewhere (Clarke 2006) suggests that governments, and 
specifically provincial governments, have enjoyed some capacity to etch 
their own Charter interpretations into micro-constitutional law. 
Yet while the federalist dialogue should at least mitigate concern that 
provinces have been shut out of Charter interpretation, several objections 
spring to mind. First, it might be suggested that the interpretations that 
emerged from Advance Cutting and Solski were not "responses" to 
provincial governments, but mere coincidence. Such scepticism is fairly 
easy to dismiss in Solski, where the Court referred specifically to Quebec's 
arguments in support of its own interpretation (SCC 2005a, para. 24). More 
explanation, however, is required to firmly establish the Advance Cutting 
decision as a "response" to government interpretation of section 1. 
Process sceptics might argue that Quebec's efforts did not actually 
influence the interpretation of section 1 that emerged from Advance 
Cutting. Once the Court concluded inLavigne that the international context 
matters, that is, the only logical next step for the Court to take was to 
conclude that the same is true for provincial context (Advance Cutting). 
Henri Brun would certainly agree. In 1985, Brun wrote that if the 
interpretation of the then new Charter should draw on the American 
example, this should not occur without reference to distinctive Canadian 
values. Brun then went on to declare that "what holds true for the cultural 
relationship between Canada and the U.S. should hold even more true for 
the cultural relationship between Quebec and Canada" (Brun 1985,10). If 
Brun's perspective is correct, then the government of Quebec did not 
contribute to, but was shut out of Charter interpretation, as the sceptics fear. 
To the extent that the decision agreed with Quebec, this was coincidence, 
not receptivity. The Court's Advance Cutting jurisprudence might have 
been cognizant of federalism, but it was simply a product of the 
court-centric process the sceptics deride. 
But the Advance Cutting jurisprudence is not so obviously compelled by 
the Court's Lavigne decision alone. For one thing, the Lavigne conclusion 
that American jurisprudence should be treated with scepticism was 
derived, in part, from differences in the structure and content of the bills of 
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rights themselves. Both countries might have committed themselves to free 
association, but the instruments with which they did so (the Charter and the 
Bill of Rights) differ considerably. This distinction cannot be made between 
provinces, to which the Charter has the appearance, at least, of applying 
equally. This could easily lead to the conclusion that while international 
context should matter, provincial ones should not—as the "centralization 
thesis" supposes, after all. But in Advance Cutting, Quebec's interpretation 
pushed the Court in another direction, federalizing the Lavigne precedent. 
But in any case, if the Court's federalism jurisprudence was simply a 
product of its own precedent, the Court should be expected to have referred 
to Lavigne at the relevant sections of Advance Cutting. Yet nowhere among 
the Advance Cutting statements on federalism, is there any mention of 
Lavigne (SCC 2001a, 266-79). 
At most then, court-centric considerations constrained the way Quebec's 
federalist interpretation could be articulated. Factors beyond its control 
forced thé province to frame a federalist interpretation in the language 
available that the Court would understand. This does not, however, 
diminish Quebec's role. Rather, it is entirely consistent with a genuine 
understanding of Charter interpretation as a dialogue, or shared 
responsibility. Court-centric considerations matter, and matter dearly. 
Precedent, judicial attitudes, and doctrine each affect judicial interpretation 
and should also be taken seriously by provinces as they craft their own. But 
purely legal factors are not determinative. They do not preclude provincial 
contributions, which should be, and according Advance Cutting are, taken 
equally seriously by the Court. 
A second challenge to the conclusion that provinces play a role in the 
process of Charter interpretation might be mounted on the bases of those 
cases where the Court rejected provincial arguments. The Supreme Court's 
rejection of Ontario in Dunmore, for instance, might be portrayed as 
suggesting that the Court does in fact retain its monopoly. But it would be an 
impoverished definition of "dialogue" that finds a monopoly simply 
because the Court does not reach the same conclusion in every instance. If 
dialogue is about shared interpretational responsibility, it would be no more 
appropriate for the Court to capitulate entirely to (provincial) governments 
than it would be to assume a lock on Charter interpretation. Courts and 
legislatures bring distinct and important perspectives to the Charter. The 
goal, therefore, should not be that one or the other prevails, but that each 
takes the other seriously (Hiebert 2002,52). Dunmore could, therefore, be 
taken as a rejection of the federalist dialogue only if the Court failed to take 
Ontario's arguments seriously. There is no evidence of this. As in Advance 
Cutting, in Dunmore a provincial government presented the Court with its 
own, federalist interpretation. In the former, the Court was persuaded. In the 
latter it was not. But consistent with notions of shared responsibility, or 
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dialogue, the Court dedicated considerable time addressing those 
arguments in each. 
The process of Charter interpretation at work in Ford, however, is not so 
easy to reconcile with federalism and its preference for local 
decision-making. The Court not only rejected Quebec's assertion that free 
expression does not protect a right to advertise in a language of choice. It did 
so without taking that interpretation seriously. Quebec had argued, for 
instance, that 2(b) does not extend to commercial expression. The Court 
concluded that it did. But its decision is remarkable for the "dearth of 
argument" to support this conclusion (de Montigny 1992,40). Rather than 
develop an argument as to why commercial expression should be protected, 
the Court chose instead to rather casually declare that there was no good 
reason it should not be (SCC1988,59). Perhaps there is no good reason. But 
dodging the philosophical and historical context of commercial expression 
in Canada is hardly consistent with the "purposive approach" to rights on 
which the decision is said to rest (see de Montigny 1992, 38-41). And 
dodging the philosophical and historical context of expression in Quebec is 
hardly consistent with a federalist approach to Charter interpretation. 
However, regarding the scepticism around the processes of Charter 
interpretation more generally, and its relationship with democracy (as 
opposed to federalism), it merits recollection that the Ford interpretation 
was the product of a dialogue between a government—though not a 
provincial government—and the Court. To date, that is, the decision in Ford 
to extend constitutional protection to commercial expression has been 
considered emblematic of the problems associated with a judicial 
monopoly over Charter interpretation. It has been characterized as the 
worst examples of judicial loose-cannonry (Kelly 2005,142; Hiebert 2002, 
90), the worst excesses of an unaccountable judiciary interpreting Charter 
rights by reference to personal preference and economic class (Mandel 
1994, 159-63). But on closer inspection, this judicial monopoly is more 
apparent than real. The Court may have rejected Quebec's interpretation of 
section 2(b). But the interpretation the Court adopted exhibits unreserved 
agreement with the federal government (Canada 1987,10-15). 
From a federalism perspective, therefore, the problem with the Charter 
process in Ford is not so much that governments were shut out of that 
process. Rather, the problem from a federalism perspective was that the 
Court seemed incapable or unwilling to respond to more than one 
government, accepting Ottawa's interpretation and rejecting Quebec's. On 
the one hand, this is to be expected. The tradition of stare decisis expects a 
uniform interpretation of the law (Brun 1985, 9), and so it is perhaps not 
surprising that to the extent the Court is persuaded by government, it is 
persuaded only by one government. However, the more recent experience 
of the Solski decision suggests that the Court is willing, or at least capable of 
retreat from this approach to the scope of Charter rights. InSolski, the Court 
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quite readily accepted Quebec's premise that Charter rights can and must 
be interpreted differently depending on the province in which they are to be 
applied. 
The federalist dialogue over the course of these five cases should relieve 
some concern that C/wrter processes are inimical to federalism. In fact, the 
influence that governments (both federal and provincial) have exerted over 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1 and of the Charter's 
substantive provisions in these cases, and those explored elsewhere, should 
relieve some of the concern sceptics have expressed about the implications 
of the processes of judicial review for Canadian democracy. But what about 
Charter outcomes? As the following describes, where the processes of the 
federalist dialogue are at work, Charter outcomes need not be less 
consistent with Canada's constitutional foundations. 
The "Outcome" of the Federalist Dialogue 
The dialogue that began with the Court's decision in Lavigne established, 
first, that when it comes to labour law, section 1 interpretation should treat 
international comparison with scepticism. In Advance Cutting, Quebec 
tailored this precedent to the context of federalism, and the Court laid down 
the following interpretation of section 1 in response: 
In a system of divided legislative authority, where the members of 
the federation differ in their cultural andhistorical experiences, the 
principle of federalism means that the application of the Charter in 
fields of provincial jurisdiction does not amount to a call for 
legislative uniformity. It expresses shared values, which may be 
achieved differently, in different settings (275). 
A similar Charter philosophy emerges from the Solski dialogue, except that 
it involves the first of the two Charter steps: the interpretation of a Charter 
right itself. Although the Court was reluctant to adopt such an approach in 
Ford, at Quebec's urging in Solski, the judges accepted that Charter rights 
can and must be interpreted according to provincial, and not only national, 
realities. 
Put succinctly, the outcome of these federalist dialogues is that when it 
comes to definition and limitation of Charter rights "provincial context 
matters". This outcome exhibits remarkable similarity to the philosophical 
notion of "value pluralism," which rests on two principal tenets. First, it 
rejects the relativistic notion that there are no commonly shared and 
objectively defined standards. Instead, "philosophical reflection supports 
what ordinary experience suggests—a non-arbitrary distinction between 
good and bad." This distinction provides the basis for defining a "floor of 
basic moral decency for individual lives and for [liberal democratic] 
societies" (Galston 1999, 770). But lest the rejection of relativism be 
confused with a support for universalism, value pluralism's second precept 
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holds that above this floor, is "a multiplicity of genuine goods that are 
qualitatively heterogeneous and cannot be reduced to a common measure of 
value" (Galston 1999, 770). Abstractly, certain objective values are 
enforceable in all liberal democratic societies, but as these values are given 
concrete expression in public policy, there must be scope for choice, 
"guided by an assessment of particular circumstances [emphasis added]" 
(Galston 1999,769). This same interpretation emerges from Solski and the 
Lavigne-Advance Cuttingsequence. Quebecers share with other Canadians 
a commitment to the rights and freedoms enumerated In the Charter. But 
when Quebec argued, and the Supreme Court accepted, that the 
actualization and limitation of those freedoms in public policy must depend 
to some extent on context—on the particularities of Quebec politics, history 
and culture—the federalist dialogue generated a value pluralistic approach 
to the Charter interpretation. 
The outcome of Dunmore, where the Ontario context did not justify a 
different approach to 2(d), might be taken as undermining this description. 
But value pluralism does not imply that any and all contextual variation will 
compel or justify a different actualization of otherwise shared values. 
Rather, it simply holds that concrete realizations of shared values should be 
considered appropriate where the cultural differences are consequential. 
"Context matters." But it must actually matter. If a context is not 
meaningfully different from elsewhere, then it does not compel or justify a 
differential approach to rights. This outcome of Dunmore can, therefore, 
also be thought of in value pluralistic terms. The Court was not convinced 
that the Ontario industry was so exceptional among provinces as to justify 
the total exclusion of agriculture workers from the scheme of legislative 
protections for collective bargaining. Rather, the Ontario industry was not 
distinct, at least in terms of the presence and proliferation of factory-like 
conditions, where workers require assistance to exercise their 2(d) rights. 
The Ontario context did not, therefore, compel a limitation that was any 
different from provinces who sought to protect the industry and the family 
farm while extending protection to workers in "agri-business". 
The outcome of the federalist dialogue in Ford is less easily reconciled 
with federalism. There are compelling reasons to insist that Quebecers be 
left to live under a different model of free expression—and of a liberal 
society—than elsewhere in Canada (Taylor 1993). However, while the 
federalist dialogue could not elicit a value pluralistic outcome, more 
conventional understanding of dialogue did produce this result. Through 
the use of the notwithstanding mechanism in the wake ofFord, Quebec was 
able to reject—if only temporarily—the Court's endorsement of the 
English-Canadian definition of "free expression". To be sure, given the 
political fallout (both in and out of Quebec), and given the convention of 
disuse into which the clause seems to have fallen, the accommodation of 
Quebec's distinctiveness would have rested better on the judicial 
recognition of divergent interpretations in the first place. Still, this may be 
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less important for those sections of the Charter for which section 33 is 
available to provincial governments than for those where it is not. This 
might explain the Court's willingness to adopt a value pluralist 
interpretation of Charter rights where section 33 is unavailable for 
provincial response (Solski and s. 23) than where it is [Ford and s. 2(b)]. 
All in all then, "value pluralism" works as an account of the outcome of 
the federalist dialogue. But it might be better to portray it in more native 
terms. I suggest "CAarter-federalism," where the Charter's guarantees are 
the "values" that take on distinctive meanings according to the "pluralism" 
of Canadian federalism. Here then, "Charter-federalism" is used as an 
empirical description of the outcome of the federalist dialogue. Elsewhere, 
Alan Cairns has used the same term as a normative depiction of what is 
required for constitutional reconciliation (Cairns 1995). Yet even though 
Cairns' term is not grounded in the same value pluralistic roots, the 
empirical CAarter-federalism—the outcome of the federalist dialogue— 
seems to captures what is called for by its normative counterpart. 
CAarter-federalism would not be adequate for those who find any 
enumeration of pan-Canadian values to be inconsistent with federalism, 
since the value-pluralism on which it rests relies on some common 
standards. But this position is not unanimously held by Charter sceptics. 
For many, a charter, if not the Charter, is not necessarily incompatible with, 
but maybe even compelled by, Canadian federalism. And for those who are 
only sceptical of the Charter as enacted, C/iarter-federalism may be 
sufficient. Samuel LaSelva, Alan Cairns, and even Charles Taylor might be 
described as occupying this position. For this group, federalism represents 
Canada's moral foundations, and the territorial identities it privileges and 
encourages cannot be ignored. But federalism, while capable of protecting 
territorial identity, fails to give adequate expression to the multiple and 
proliferating identities that are not tied to aparticular place. This is precisely 
why LaSelva and Cairns in particular believe a bill of rights is not only 
acceptable in, but required by modern Canada to protect "individuals and 
groups for whom federalism's privileging of territory is experienced as 
narrow and confining" (Cairns 1995,192; LaSelva 1996,80; Taylor 1993, 
181-82). Provincial identities are not exhaustive. The Charter gives 
recognition to these identities as "a set of common values, shared 
customs... and implicitunderstandings" (David Cameron in LaSelva 1996, 
88). It expresses, in short, the Canadian will to live together. The problem, 
as LaSelva and Cairns see it, is that the Charter gives no direction as to how 
this will is to be reconciled with the equally important federalist impulse to 
live apart (LaSelva 1996, 76-77, 96; Cairns 1995, 189; Taylor 1993, 
182-83). 
Specific direction out of this CAarter-federalism paradox is varied, and 
often vague. At its most basic, however, a federalist theory of the Charter 
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must recognize both the will to live together and the will to live apart 
(LaSelva 1996,29). It must involve a "positive relationship" where rights 
are "blended" with federalism, and Canadians' multiple (i.e. Charter, and 
federal) identities are recognized and protected simultaneously (Cairns 
1995,189,214; 1992,62). But the most important directive may be that the 
blending of Charter identities with their federal ones should not be 
symmetrical. There are important value differences between the English-
speaking provinces that should remain protected from any centralizing 
tendencies (Vengroff and Morton 2000, 381-82; Wiseman 1996). Yet 
many believe that English Canadians are by now at least as concerned with 
Charter identities as with their provincial ones (Morton and Knopff 2000, 
60; Morton 1995) and if the differences between English-speaking 
provinces appear profound, it is often because they have been exaggerated 
to dilute the significance of the more meaningful differences between 
Quebec and Canada outside of that province (Latouche 1990, 116). It is 
therefore consistent with Canadian federalism to hold the English-speaking 
provinces relatively uniform standard—relative, that is, to Quebec, where a 
singularly distinctive provincial context compels a singularly distinctive 
understanding of rights (McRoberts 1997,110-16; Cairns 1995; LaSelva 
1996; LaForest 1995). To reconcile Quebec with the Charter requires a 
form of "deep diversity." If the Charter helps define what it means to be 
Canadian, it must recognize that what it means to be Canadian is different in 
Quebec than elsewhere (Taylor 1993). 
This sketch of the normative CTwrter-federalism establishes that in a 
modern Canada, provincial societies should be held accountable for a 
certain level of protection for pan-Canadian identities. But it also requires 
assurances that Charter outcomes are, in turn, sensitive to differences in 
provincial context, particularly Quebec. This is nothing new, of course. The 
mega-constitutional politics of Meech Lake were intended to achieve just 
this. The Accord included provision for provincial input into Supreme 
Court appointments to ensure Charter outcomes were sensitive to 
federalism generally, and a distinct society clause to make them sensitive to 
Quebec in particular. 
What is new is a claim that, in the absence of formal amendment, the 
federalist dialogue generates an empirical CAarter-federalism consistent 
with its normative counterpart. It involves a "positive relationship," 
reinforcing the idea that Canadians share certain values, while 
simultaneously stressing the importance of provincial societies by 
encouraging those common values to take on distinct local meanings. 
Furthermore, the Carter-federalism of the federalist dialogue reinforces 
the notion that the Charter must be applied asymmetrically if it is to 
conform to Canada's constitutional foundations. It may not carry the 
symbolic weight of a "distinct society" clause, but the effect of 
Charter-federalism is the same. If the realization of rights is made 
dependent on provincial context, and if the Quebec context is distinct from 
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the relatively homogenous English provinces, then the Charter will 
necessarily take on a distinct meaning in Quebec. Indeed, this is the 
outcome of the dialogues here. At the level of section 1, for instance, the 
Ontario context in Dunmore was not sufficiently different to require a 
different limitation of Charter rifgits, unlike the Quebec context va Advance 
Cutting, 
This asymmetry is even more obvious in the case of the Charter-
federalism emerging from Solski. The right to minority language education 
may be an important part of what it means to "belong" to Canadian society. 
But given Quebec's particular linguistic dynamic, this right means 
something different in that province than elsewhere, and that difference is 
"deeper" than the need for greater limitations. The difference extends to the 
very understanding of what the right to minority language education means. 
The Court's acceptance of Quebec's interpretation of section 23 in 
Solski—the outcome of the federalist dialogue—is recognition of a deeper 
diversity allowing Quebecers to live according to a different understanding 
of Canadian society, and should address the sceptics' concerns. 
Conclusions 
To date, explanations of Lavigne, Advance Cutting, and Dunmore, in 
particular, have been centred in traditional (i.e. non-federal) notions of 
Charter processes and outcomes. Jamie Cameron asks, for instance, 
whether Advance Cutting and Dunmore should be understood as 
expressions of "judicial sympathy" for labour, or as well-defined 
"principles of Charter interpretation" (Cameron 2002, 69). Cameron's 
question reveals an understanding of Charter interpretation as a 
court-centric process. Either judicial attitudes or the law itself define 
Charter interpretation, but not external factors, such as the provinces' own 
conceptions. A similarly non-federal perspective informs Cameron's 
impressions of the outcomes, as they are concernedmerely with their policy 
implications. 
This paper is not meant to discount the relevance of these traditional 
concerns. On the contrary, from a process perspective, the interpretational 
jump from Lavigne to Advance Cutting reveals the importance of 
court-centric influences. In the absence of Lavigne, Quebec wouldhave had 
neither the footing nor the language to construct its own Advance Cutting 
interpretation. Nor should a concern for policy-related outcomes be 
dismissed. Prior to Advance Cutting and Dunmore, Charter jurisprudence 
could best be described as anti-labour (Mandel 1994; Hutchinson 1995; 
Hutchinson and Petter 1988). But each of these cases represents something 
of a victory for labour, and so their significance for industrial relations 
cannot be disregarded (Monahan 2002, 5). 
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However, this conventional focus has also led scholars to overlook the 
significance of these cases for federalism. Seen here, these labour law cases 
along with Ford and Solski show that the Charter is more consistent with 
Canadian federalism than the sceptics would have us believe. For one thing, 
the outcome of these disputes—described here as CTzarter-federalism— 
largely conforms to what is needed for the Charter's reconciliation with 
federalism. The Charter's pan-Canadian values, through section 1 and the 
interpretation of Charter rights themselves, have been encouraged to take 
on asymmetrically particular meaning depending on provincial context. 
What is more, whereas Charter sceptics have assumed that 
reconciliation could only take place via constitutional change, 
Charter-federalism has emerged by way of a less formal process. Indeed, 
Charter-federalism cannot be understood without reference to the 
federalist dialogue. Courts and provinces are uniquely situated vis-à-vis 
federalism and the Charter. Courts, isolated from the political imperatives 
of provincial politics, bring a particular perspective to Charter 
interpretation. Provinces, by contrast, seem better positioned to appreciate 
local context. This does not suggest that provinces cannot make impartial 
judgments about rights or that courts are incapable of appreciating 
provincial context, only that each partner must take their own, and the 
other's role seriously. Such is not always the case. Ford is a good example, 
as are certain cases pertaining to the compliance of the public health care 
system with the Charter5 But when the provinces and the Court do take the 
federalist dialogue seriously, as they did in Advance Cutting, Solski and 
elsewhere—including other health care litigation6—it can lead to a process 
of Charter interpretation in which provinces play an important role, 
alleviating concerns of judicial monopoly. When that process is taken 
seriously, at least, both it and the outcome it can generate are more 
consistent with Canada's constitutional foundations than typically 
portrayed. 
Notes 
1. I would like to acknowledge the financial support of SSHRC, and thank Janet 
Hiebert, Emmett Macfarlane and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful 
comments on earlier drafts. Any errors or omissions are my own. 
2. Some scholars have suggested that this exercise endeavours simply to 
"Charter-proof* legislation by anticipating what the judiciary will say. It may 
simply be, then, that the rates of judicial nullification have decreased because 
legislatures have been self-censoring before the judiciary has the opportunity 
(Gagnon and Iacovino, 2007:41) 
3. McLachlin, Bastarache, Binne, Iaccobucci, and Major. 
4. Arbour and Gonthier concurred with LeBel in full. L'Heureux-Dubé and 
Iaccobucci concurred on the importance of provincial context in a section 1 
analysis. 
5. The Chaoulli (SCC, 2005b) and Eldridge (SCC, 1997) decisions—striking down 
Quebec's ban on private health care insurance and forcing BC to provide sign 
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language interpreters in the provinces hospitals, respectively—have been cited as 
examples of the Supreme Court's insensitivity to federalism, although it should 
be noted that the former was technically decided on the basis of the Quebec 
Charter of Human Rights and not the Canadian Charter. 
6. The Auton (SCC, 2004) decision upholding BC's decision not to fund a particular 
treatment for autism in young children has been explained as a product of the 
federalist dialogue (Clarke, 2006). 
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